The meaning of a term such as “materiality,” which involves a claim to truth, especially when it is used to dispel the lie of the centrality of human thought with respect to material nature, nevertheless remains within the deceptive realm of the reversals and substitutions of rhetorical language. This paper considers the ways in which this predicament, identified by Nietzsche in “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” is played out in works of art that refer to the materiality of language.
Materiality and Rhetoric
Nietzsche, in ‘On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,’ defines human thought as an elaborate deception, the purpose of which is to conceal its own utter meaninglessness and inconsequentiality in relation to material nature. This lie that claims to be truth is achieved through the reversals and substitutions of rhetorical language. The meaning of a term such as ‘materiality,’ which involves a claim to truth, especially when it is used to dispel the lie of the centrality of human thought, nevertheless remains within the realm of such reversals and substitutions. This predicament can be further complicated by considering that the rhetorical dimension of language is the nonphenomenal (and so, in a certain sense, material) condition for any reference to the world (as in the work of Paul de Man, an important reader of Nietzsche). It is impossible to escape, although for Nietzsche art occupies a privileged place, since it is at least a lie that is aware that it is a lie.
In this paper, I would like to consider how the meaning of ‘materiality’ (and ‘matter,’ ‘materialism,’ etc.) is phenomenalized through rhetorical figures and tropes in order to try to problematize its relationship with thought, and how the predicament that conditions this relationship is played out in art. (One example could be certain of Nauman’s early works that involve both the materiality of materials and the materiality of language (in the form of puns, or paronomasia), such as Flour Arrangements (1966).)
Matérialité et rhétorique
Nietzsche, dans ‘Vérité et mensonge au sens extra-moral,’ définit la pensée humaine comme une tromperie élaborée, dont le but est de dissimuler sa propre insignifiance et inconséquence par rapport à la nature matérielle. Ce mensonge qui prétend être la vérité est obtenu par des inversions et des substitutions dans le langage rhétorique. La signification d'un terme tel que ‘matérialité,’ qui implique une prétention à la vérité, en particulier lorsqu'il est utilisé pour dissiper le mensonge de la centralité de la pensée humaine, reste néanmoins dans le domaine de ces inversions et substitutions. On peut encore compliquer cette situation en considérant que la dimension rhétorique du langage est la condition non phénoménale (et donc, en un certain sens, matérielle) de toute référence au monde (comme dans l'œuvre de Paul de Man, un important lecteur de Nietzsche). Il est impossible d'y échapper, bien que pour Nietzsche l'art occupe une place privilégiée, puisqu'il est au moins un mensonge qui a conscience d'être un mensonge.
Dans cet article, je voudrais examiner comment la signification de la ‘matérialité’ (et de la ‘matière,’ du ‘matérialisme,’ etc.) est phénoménalisé par des figures et des tropes rhétoriques afin d'essayer de problématiser sa relation avec la pensée, et comment la situation difficile qui conditionne cette relation se joue dans l'art. (Un exemple pourrait être certaines des premières œuvres de Nauman qui impliquent à la fois la matérialité des matériaux et la matérialité du langage (sous la forme de jeux de mots ou de paronomases), comme Flour Arrangements (1966)).
Dr. Dominic Rahtz
Reader in History and Theory of Contemporary Art
University for the Creative Arts
https://www.uca.ac.uk/about-us/our-staff/dominic-rahtz/
The German art photographers Bernd and Hilla Becher typically photographed industrial buildings as individual objects detached from their surroundings, which they arranged in series to bring out variations in form, an approach that has been criticized for its indifference to the social conditions of industrial production, as a formalism that precludes history. In this paper, I suggest that the Bechers’ work instead reveals another historicity, that of the mode of existence of technical objects, in which, according to Bernard Stiegler, “inorganic matter organizes itself.”